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WEIGHING TEMPORAL PROXIMITY IN
TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIMS
Abstract: In recent years, employment discrimination retaliation claims
have been a growing focus of federal employment law. The primary
source of this protection has been § 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Title VII retaliation claims are litigated using a
common judicial framework originally developed for discrimination
claims. Courts differ, however, in their individual application of this
framework and, as a result, vary significantly in their standards for
litigating a Title VII retaliation claim. A significant source of this
disparity has been the way in which courts treat the time that elapses
between an employee's anti-discrimination activity and an employer's
allegedly retaliatory action ("temporal proximity"). This Note evaluates
the conflicting approaches to the element of temporal proximity. It
concludes that despite the conflicting treatment of temporal proximity
evidence by different federal jurisdictions, a single, optimal rule for
such evidence can be identified.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, employment discrimination retaliation claims
have been a growing focus of federal employment law.' Employees
seeking legal recourse for employment discrimination have increas-
ingly sought protection from employers attempting to retaliate against
their anti-discrimination efforts. 2
 The primary source of this protec-
tion has been § 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 Ti-
I SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 658 (2000); Penny Nathan Kahan & Lori L.
Deem, Retaliation Update, A.L.I.-A.BA. Course of Study, Current Developments in Em-
ployment Law 431, 434 (July 26-28, 2001).
2 See ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 1, at 658; Kahan & Deem, supra note I, at 434.
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994); see Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 434. Most federal
anti-retaliation provisions contain the same basic protections as the Title VII provision. See,
e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1994);
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1994). Courts em-
ploy the same framework in adjudicating claims pursuant to each of these statutes. See, e.g.,
Casumpang v. Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 142, No. 99-
16674, 2001 WL 1265226, at 4'14 (9th Cir. 2001) (Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act); Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3c1 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (Rehabilitation
Act); Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3c1 1047, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 2000) (42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 511 (7th Cir, 1998) (ADA); Moon v.
Transp. Drivers, Inc., 836 F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir. 1987) (Surface Transportation Assistance
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tie VII protects employees both from discriminatory treatment in em-
ployment and from retaliation by employers for asserting their rights
against alleged discrimination. 4
 In a discrimination claim, an em-
ployee alleges that an employer treated the employee differently be-
cause of a statutorily protected characteristic.5 In a retaliation claim,
an employee alleges that an employer treated the employee adversely
because the employee protested alleged discrimination. 6 Title VII re-
taliation claims are litigated using a common judicial framework
originally developed for discrimination claims.' Courts differ, how-
ever, in their individual application of this framework and, as a result,
vary significantly in their standards for litigating a Title VII retaliation
claim.5
 A significant source of this disparity has been the way in which
courts treat the time that elapses between an employee's anti-
discrimination activity and an employer's allegedly retaliatory action
("temporal proximity") .9
Temporal proximity is crucial in many retaliation claims because
retaliatory employers rarely memorialize their retaliatory motives. 0 In
F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir. 1987) (Surface Transportation Assistance Act). Although this Note
focuses on Title VII, many of the cases discussed involve claims pursuant to other federal
statutes. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-48 (2000)
(ADEA). Indeed, the analysis is applicable to these statutes as well. See id.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) , -3(a) (1994).
5 Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litiga-
tion: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality' Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 187 (1997).
6 See, e.g., Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1177 (2d Cir. 1996); see also infra
note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship of retaliation claims to under-
lying allegations of discrimination).
7
 Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 435. The United States Supreme Court has devel-
oped this common framework in the discrimination context based on Title VII as well as
other statutes. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-48; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
506-11 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-05 (1973); see also supra note 3 (dis-
cussing anti-retaliation context).
8 See Edward T. Ellis & Suzanne 0. Rudder, Current Developments in the Law of Retaliation,
A.L.I.-A.BA. Course of Study, Current Developments in Employment Law 241, 246-57
(July 27, 2000); Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII,
the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 Mo.
L. REV. 115, 125-27 (1998); Debbie Rodman Sandler & Laura W. Brewer, Retaliation Claims
Under the Civil Rights Acts: Theacherous Waters for Employers, 13 LAB. LAIN. 107, 107-15 (1997);
Stephen W. Smith, Title VII's National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie
Case?, 12 LAB. LAw. 371, 381 (1997).
9 See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257.
1° See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 534 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("employers who discriminate are
not likely to announce their discriminatory motive"); Ann Clarke Snell & Lisa R. Eskow,
What Motivates the Ultimate Decision maker? An Analysis of Legal Standards for Proving Causation
and Malice in Employment Retaliation Suits, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 381, 396 (1998).
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the absence of such "smoking gun" evidence, many retaliation claims
are mostly, if not entirely, built on circumstantial evidence including
temporal proximity. 11
 Furthermore, temporal proximity has been rec-
ognized as particularly powerful circumstantial evidence of retalia-
tion." Short intervals of time between an employee's anti-
discrimination efforts and an employer's allegedly retaliatory action
can create powerful inferences of retaliation." Yet courts have not
adopted consistent standards for weighing temporal proximity evi-
dence." As a result, temporal proximity is not given the same weight
among courts, nor even, on occasion, in different cases within the
same jurisdiction. 15
 Although the standards for evaluating temporal
proximity are often defined in similar terms, the differences in the
application of those definitions are significant and may be crucial to
the success of a retaliation claim."
This Note proposes a framework for assessing the appropriate
weight that should be given to temporal proximity evidence in Title
VII retaliation claims. Part I examines the structure of retaliation
claims and identifies the role of temporal proximity within that
framework. 17
 Part II explores the various ways in which courts cur-
rently weigh temporal proximity and defines three broad categories of
rules for the treatment of such evidence ("temporal proximity
rules"). 18
 Part III analyzes the components of these rules and estab-
lishes from them the basic principles determining the appropriate
weight for temporal proximity." Finally, Part IV defines and proposes
11 Snell & Eskow, supra note 10, at 396; see Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257.
12 See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257 (identifying temporal proximity as the "single
most important factor in a circumstantial retaliation case"); see also Essary & Friedman,
supra note 8, at 143; Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 445; Peter M. Panken, Retaliation Up-
date: Don't Get Mad, Don't Get Even, Just Be Savvy, A.L,L-A.B.A. Course of Study, Basic Em-
ployment and Labor Law—in-Depth 547, 571 (Aug. 13-17, 2001); Sandler & Brewer, supra
note 8, at 119; Snell & Eskow, supra note 10, at 401.
13
 See, e.g., Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at 119.
14 Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257. ,
13 See id.; see also Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2000)
(noting court precedents "split" on weight of temporal proximity).
19
 Compare, e.g., O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001)
(finding three months not "very close" and therefore not sufficient evidence of temporal
proximity, but one and one-half months 'very close" and therefore sufficient), with Holava-
Brown v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 98-9661, 1999 WL 642966, at *4 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding less
than three months "close" and therefore sufficient).
17 See infra notes 21-89 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 90-122 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 123-238 and accompanying text.
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a single rule for weighing temporal proximity evidence based on
those principles. 20
I. THE ROLE OF TEMPORAL PROXIMITY IN A TITLE VII
RETALIATION CLAIM
A. The Retaliation Framework: Title VII and the Burden Shift
Title VII has long been the cornerstone of federal employment
discrimination law. 21
 Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.22
 The statute
provides employees with an administrative procedure for pursuing
claims through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and creates a private right of action for employees seeking
damages or relief for employment discrimination. 23
 Title VII, there-
fore, not only prohibits employment discrimination, but also enables
employees to seek recourse for discrimination. 24
In addition to prohibiting discrimination, Tide VII protects em-
ployees from retaliation in response to their anti-discrimination activ-
ity. 23
 A retaliation claim begins with alleged employment discrimina-
tion. 26
 The employee responds to the alleged discrimination by
protesting the discrimination in some way. 27
 This may be as informal
as discussing it with the employer or as formal as filing an official
complaint with the EEOC. 28
 The focus of a Tide VII retaliation claim,
however, is an employment action, such as firing, demotion, or reduc-
tion in pay, that allegedly occurs in response to the employee's anti-
discrimination activity. 29
 Specifically, Tide VII prohibits an employer
2° See infra notes 239-392 and accompanying text.
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 434.
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
" Id. § 2000e-5(a)—(f).
24 See id.
25 Id. § 2000e-3(a); see Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 116.
26
 See, e.g., Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods„ Inc., 212 F.3d 493,500
(9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 500-01.
" See id. at 500-01,506.
" See id. at 500-03; Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 441. Because a retaliation claim is
based on facts and legal protections independent of an underlying discrimination claim, a
retaliation claim can succeed regardless of the success of the underlying discrimination
claim. See Douglas E. Ray, Title VII Retaliation Cases: Creating a New Protected Class, 58 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 405,407 (1997); Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at 109-10. As a result, the
potential for frivolous retaliation claims has been a significant concern of courts and crit-
ics. See Ray, supra, at 407 n.9; see also Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Val-
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from retaliating against an employee because that employee has "op-
posed" unlawful discrimination in the workplace or has "participated"
in any process or investigation directed against such discrimination."
The rationale for these provisions is to ensure employees full access to
Title VII's anti-discrimination protections. 31
 Protecting employees
from employment discrimination, after all, would be meaningless if
an employer could simply fire an employee who sought to protest dis-
criminatory behavior."
Title VII also establishes the basic requirements for proving re-
taliation.33
 In defining these requirements, the statute attempts a care-
ful balance between employee rights and employer interests that
courts struggle to maintain.34
 To succeed in a Title VII retaliation
claim, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged
in a statutorily protected anti-discrimination activity ("protected activ-
ity"); (2) the plaintiff's employer took adverse employment action
against the plaintiff ("adverse action"); and (3) a causal connection
existed between the plaintiff's protected activity and the employer's
adverse action ("causal connection")." Retaliation claims proceed in
one of two ways, depending on the nature of the evidence available."
Plaintiffs with direct evidence of retaliation present such evidence
without the benefit of a shifting burden of production ("burden
ley, 145 F.Sd 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing impact of this concern on evaluation of
temporal proximity evidence).
30
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). For comparison of opposition and participation clauses, see
Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 244-46; Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 121-29; Kahan
& Deem, supra note 1, at 436-41; Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at 112-15. Both for dis-
crimination and retaliation claims, Title VII provides for injunctive relief and "such
affirmative action as may be appropriate," including reinstatement, back pay, and other
equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
51
 See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 243. Like the anti-discrimination provisions, how-
ever, Title V1I's anti-retaliation provisions are not intended to interfere with "traditional
management prerogatives" of employers or protect employees beyond the specific context
of retaliation. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (citing
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 205-06 (1979)); see also Dour, 145 F.Sd at 657 (Title
VII was not enacted to guarantee tenure in the workplace."); Swanson v. Gen. Servs.
Admin., 110 F.Sd 1180, 1188 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997) ("fide V1I's protection ... does not per-
mit EEOC complainants to disregard work rules or job requirements.").
32 See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 243.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
54 See Snell & Eskow, supra note 10, at 382.
95 See Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 120; see also, e.g., Passantino, 212 F.Sd at 506.
Although courts describe these proof requirements as necessary to establish a prima fade
case, they are the same elements required ultimately to prove retaliation according to the
terms of the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
30 See Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 120.
746
	
Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 43;741
shift")." Plaintiffs with only circumstantial evidence, however, experi-
ence this benefit."
In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Carp. v. Green, the Supreme Court
of the United States adopted a burden shift for Title VII discrimina-
tion cases." Since McDonnell Douglas, all United States Courts of Ap-
peals have adopted the burden shift for retaliation claims under Title
VII as well." The burden shift involves three steps.'" First, the plaintiff
must make a showing of a prima facie case of retaliation." If the
plaintiffs showing is sufficient, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action
taken against the plaintiff." If the defendant articulates such a reason,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the stated reason
for the adverse action is actually a pretext for retaliation." Under the
burden shift, therefore, proving pretext satisfies the plaintiffs ulti-
mate burden of proof in a retaliation claim."
Since McDonnell Douglas, the burden shift has provided the
framework for presenting and evaluating the circumstantial evidence
so common to Title VII claims." The Supreme Court introduced the
burden shift as the best means to fulfill Title VII's purpose of protect-
37 See Brodin, supra note 5, at 188-89; Smith, supra note 8, at 382.
36 See Brodin, supra note 5, at 188-89. Although courts implicitly adopt this distinction,
they usually begin explicitly analyzing a claim with the burden shift analysis. See infra notes
39-45 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248,
1252 (10th Cir. 2001) (beginning analysis with prima facie case requirements).
" See 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
40 See Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 435-36.
41 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; see Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 120-21.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; see infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
43 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; see Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 120. If the de-
fendant is unable to produce evidence of legitimate, non-retaliatory motive after the plain-
tiff has established a prima facie case, then the plaintiff wins the claim as a matter of law.
See St. Mary's Honor Gtr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 n.5 (1993); see also Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146-48 (2000) (elaborating on the standard adopted in
Hicks).
" Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; see Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 121.
13 See Brodin, supra note 5, at 192. At the pretext stage, the plaintiff's burden "merges
with the ultimate burden" of proving the claim. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The plaintiff thus
satisfies the ultimate burden of proof with circumstantial evidence as fully under the bur-
den shift as might have been possible if the plaintiff had direct evidence of retaliation. See
id.
See Brodin, supra note 5, at 190-91 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at. 255 n.8); Smith, supra
note 8, at 383 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271(1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[T] he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to
compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come
by.")); see also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 525 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ing equality in the workplace. 47
 It "is intended progressively to
sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question" of a Title VII
claim by creating an "intermediate" burden of production—the prima
facie burden—distinct from the plaintiff's "ultimate" burden. 45 In do-
ing so, the burden shift facilitates access to Title VII protection for
plaintiffs with no direct evidence of retaliation. 49
B. Temporal Proximity in the Burden Shift Proof Scheme: The Prima Facie
Case and the Causal Connection Requirement
In most jurisdictions, the elements required to establish a prima
facie case of retaliation are the same as those required ultimately to
prove retaliation: protected activity, adverse action, and a causal con-
nection." Because of the burden shift, however, the plaintiffs entire
burden of proof need not be satisfied at the prima facie stage. 51 In-
stead, the plaintiff need only raise an inference of retaliation to state a
prima facie case, a burden that the Supreme Court has defined as
"not onerous."52 The plaintiff may then fulfill the burden by proving
pretext."
Determining the point at which a plaintiff has established a
prima facie case, therefore, is essential for two reasons. 54 First, it en-
ables a plaintiff with no direct evidence of retaliation to proceed with
a claim—thereby fulfilling the original rationale for the burden
shift.55 Second, establishing a prima fade case shifts not only the bur-
den but the entire battle." Although the plaintiff still bears the ulti-
mate burden of proof, the plaintiff need not produce the same kind
or amount of evidence under the burden shift as would be necessary
47 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800.
48
 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-55,
45 See Brodin, supra note 5, at 192; Smith, supra note 8, at 383. For a critique of the
burden shift, see generally Smith, supra note 8.
60 See, e.g., Burns v. Uninet, Inc., No. 99-1264, 2000 WL 349763, at *4 (4th Cir. 2000);
Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 190 F.3d 398, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1999). Some
courts, however, have enumerated an employer's awareness of the employee's protected
activity as a separate element of a prima facie case. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
No. 99-4150, 2001 WL 845486, at *4 (6th Cir. 2001); Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205,
216 (2d Cir. 2001). For further discussion of the knowledge requirement, see infra notes
215-238 and accompanying text.
" See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
" See id. at 253.
" See Brodin, supra note 5, at 189-92; Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 447-48,
54 See Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 120-21.
m See Brodin, supra note 5, at 187-89; Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 120-21.
55 See Brodin, supra note 5, at 192.
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to prove retaliation directly. 57 At the outset, a plaintiff needs only
enough evidence of protected activity, adverse action, and a causal
connection to create an inference of retaliation. 58 The fight then
moves to the issue of whether the employer's stated non-retaliatory
motive is pretextual."
The burden does not shift, however, unless the plaintiff estab-
lishes a prima facie case. 60
 Courts do not necessarily agree on the
amount and nature of evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie
case. 61 Each proof requirement for a retaliation claim has generated
varied court interpretation, including the definitions of both pro-
tected activity and adverse action." The causal connection require-
ment, however, has generated the most intense debate because it is
the linchpin of a retaliation claim.° Title VII, after all, only prohibits
adverse action taken because of protected activity.° Without a causal
connection requirement, Title VII would in practice require an em-
ployer to prove affirmatively legitimate reasons for every adverse ac-
tion taken against ati employee who at any previous point had en-
gaged in a protected activity.° The causal connection, therefore, is
often the pivotal and most contentious issue in retaliation claims 66
The issue, then, is determining the level of proof required for a
causal connection in the prima facie case. 67 Requiring minimal evi-
dence might undermine the ultimate proof of a causal connection or
enable baseless claims to proceed.° Requiring too much evidence, in
contrast, would defeat the purpose of the burden shift by forcing the
plaintiff to prove the paramount issue of retaliation at the outset."
Moreover, courts must determine not only the level of proof, but also
the kind of proof that satisfies both the prima facie case and ultithate
57 See id. at 191-92.
58 See Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 435.
59 See id.
6° See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-55.
61 See Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 116-17; Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at
108.
62 See Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 121,133-34.
65 See Snell & Eskow, supra note 10, at 384-86.
64 See id. at 384.
65 See Snell & Eskow, supra note 10, at 382; Smith, supra note 8, at 392.
66 See Donna Smith Code & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful Retalia-
tion tinder the Title V1I. Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It When They See It?, 14 LAB. LAW.
373,380 n.37 (1998).
67 See id. at 380.
66 See Smith, supra note 8, at 377-78; Snell & Eskow, supra note 10, at 382-83.
66 See Brodin, supra note 5, at 191-92; Ray, supra note 29, at 423-24.
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burdens.7° For example, an employer's comments or expressions of
dislike for an employee, failure to follow standard practices in dealing
with an employee, and disparate treatment of employees each may be
circumstantial evidence of a causal connection. 71
But perhaps the most important and most common circumstan-
tial evidence of a causal connection is temporal proximity. 72 The rea-
sons are straightforward. 73
 The sooner adverse action is taken after
protected activity, the stronger the implication that the protected ac-
tivity caused the adverse action, particularly if no legitimate reason for
the adverse action is evident.74
 In addition, every retaliation claim
bears evidence of some interval between protected activity and ad-
verse action, whether that interval is measured in minutes or
months. 75
Courts have spent considerable time and energy evaluating tem-
poral proximity evidence in retaliation clahns. 76
 In the process, they
have found several areas of agreement regarding its treatment. 77
 For
example, courts typically agree that temporal proximity is significant
circumstantial evidence of retaliation. 78 Moreover, courts generally
agree that temporal proximity alone can be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case, even though some do not consider it sufficient per
se." Additionally, although no jurisdiction has adopted a bright line
test for determining the amount of time that is probative of a causal
connection, courts recognize that a very short interval between pro-
tected activity and adverse action is highly probative of a causal con-
nection.80
 Conversely, courts also agree that extended intervals may
disprove a causal connection. 81
7° See Snell & Eskow, supra note 10, at 385,396-405.
71 See Ray, supra note 29, at 425-29; Snell & Eskow, supra note 10, at 396-405.
72 See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257; Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 143;
Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at 119.
78 See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at. 257; Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 143;
Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at 119.
74
 See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257; Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at 119.
75 See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257; Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at 119.
7° See infra notes 123-238 and accompanying text.
77 See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257; Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at 119.
78 See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257; Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at 119.
79 See Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 445; see also infra notes 148-181 and accompany-
ing text (discussing sufficiency of temporalproximity for prima facie causal connection).
8° See Oest v. III. Dep't of Corr., 240 F.3d 605,616 (7th Cir. 2001) (opposing adoption
of "a mechanistically applied time frame"); Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257; Essary &
Friedman, supra note 8, at 119.
91 See Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 445; Snell & Eskow, supra note 10, at 401.
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In 2001, in Clark County School District v. Breeden, the Supreme
Court cemented the areas of general agreement among lower courts
on temporal proximity. 82
 The Court held that very close temporal
proximity alone could be sufficient evidence for a prima fade causal
connection." The Court further held, however, that the twenty-month
period between protected activity and adverse action in the instant
case was too long by itself to establish a causal connection." The
Court also identified an additional element necessary to prove retalia-
tion under Title VII, agreeing with many lower courts and holding
that a plaintiff must prove that the employer knew about the pro-
tected activity ("knowledge requirement"). 85
The Supreme Court, however, left unresolved a number of issues
regarding the appropriate weight for temporal proximity in retalia-
tion claims." The Court did not explicitly define temporal proximity
nor establish a mechanism for determining the length of time
sufficient to establish a prima facie case, but held only that twenty
months was too long in the factual context of Breeden.87 Additionally,
the Court did not identify the circumstances in which temporal prox-
imity alone would be sufficient to establish a causal connection in a
prima fade case.88 Finally, the Court did not determine what weight
temporal proximity should be given beyond the prima fade case
stage.89
II. TEMPORAL PROXIMITY RULES: THREE APPROACHES
TO TEMPORAL PROXIMITY
Lower federal courts have taken a variety of approaches to the
issues left unresolved in Clark County School District v. Breeden 9 0 A num-
ber of factors contribute to the relative weight that courts considering
retaliation claims give to temporal proximity evidence. 9' In general,
however, the ways in which courts weigh temporal proximity can be
" See 532 U.S. 268,273-74 (2001).
83 See id. at 273.
84 See id. at 274.
See id at 273; see also Cude & Steger, supra note 66, at 380; Ellis & Rudder, supra note
8, at 258.
88
 See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273-74.
87 See id.
" See id.
" See id.
" See infra notes 123-238 and accompanying text.
91 See infra notes 123-238 and accompanying text.
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categorized into three types of rules: strong proximity rules, weak
proximity rules, and case by case rules.92
A. Strong Proximity Rules
Some courts give substantial weight to temporal proximity evi-
dence and have adopted corresponding rules in their case law
("strong proximity rules"). 93
 A strong proximity rule reflects two un-
derlying principles. 94
 First, courts with strong proximity rules recog-
nize temporal proximity as highly probative of a causal connection-
that is, evidence that an employer took adverse action soon after pro-
tected activity raises a significant inference that the employer took the
adverse action because of the protected activity. 95 Second, courts with
strong proximity rules recognize the prima facie burden as lower than
the ultimate burden of proof.98 In these jurisdictions, temporal prox-
imity is sufficient to establish a prima facie causal connection because
the plaintiff does not bear the full burden of proof at the prima facie
stage." Courts that have strong proximity rules, therefore, generally
treat the establishment of a prima facie case as "de minimis." 98 As a
result, a strong proximity rule enables some plaintiffs to proceed with
claims that would otherwise fail for insufficient evidence.99
For example, in 2001, in Cifra v. General Electric Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held temporal proxim-
ity evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie causal connection. 104
In Cifra, the plaintiff alleged that she had been fired because of her
complaints that her supervisor had discriminated against her on the
92 See infra notes 93-214 and accompanying text.
93 See Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 242 F.3d 996, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 2001); Passan-
dno v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prod., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th Cir. 2000); Ho-
lava-Brown v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 98-9661,1999 WL 642966, at *4-5 (2d Cir. 1999); Oliver
v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1988); Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80,
86 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
" See Slattery v, Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001); Yartzoff v.
Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987); Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 86.
95
 See Slattery, 248 F.Sd at 95; Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376; Mitchell 759 F.2d at 86.
96 See Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95; Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376; Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 86.
97 See Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95; Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376; Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 86.
" See Slattery, 248 F.Sd at 94 (defining prima fade burden as "de minimis" (quoting
Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994))); Mitchell 759 F.2d at 86
(describing prima facie burden as "not great" (quoting McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d
783, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
99 See Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 2001); Passantino, 212 F.3d at
507.
190 252 F.Sd at 217.
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basis of gender."' Her termination occurred twenty days after her
employer learned that she had retained an attorney to pursue a dis-
crimination claim against the employer. 102 Applying a strong proxim-
ity rule, the court held that twenty days between the protected activity
and adverse action was sufficient evidence of a causal connection to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation.'"
B. Weak Proximity Rules
A number of jurisdictions have adopted rules giving temporal
proximity evidence significantly less weight in retaliation claims
("weak proximity rules"). 104 Courts with weak proximity rules harbor
significant concern for the limited purposes of Tide VIPs anti-
retaliation provisions.'" These courts give less weight to temporal
proximity evidence to prevent plaintiffs from pursuing retaliation
claims based on insufficient evidence.'" Jurisdictions with weak prox-
imity rules are similar to those with strong proximity rules in several
important ways. 197 Both types of jurisdictions assign some probative
value to temporal proximity evidence and recognize its sufficiency to
establish a prima facie case in at least some contexts.'" Moreover,
courts with weak proximity rules, like those with strong proximity
rules, still vary among themselves in their treatment of temporal prox-
imity.'" Yet plaintiffs who rely substantially on temporal proximity
evidence may face appreciably greater challenges in pursuing their
claims under weak proximity rules.'"
1°1 Id. at 210.
102
 Id. at 217.
"13 Id
1°4 See Warren v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 00-3560, 2001 WI. 1216979, at *4 (6th
Cir. 2001); O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001); Dowe v.
Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.Sd 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998); Swanson
v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188, 1188 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997).
1°5 See Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657 ("Title VII was not enacted to guarantee tenure in the
workplace."); Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3 ("Title protection against retaliation does
not permit EEOC complainants to disregard work rules or job requirements.").
106 See Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657; Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3.
107 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4; Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95; ()Neal, 237 F.Sd at 1253;
Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657; Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188, 1188 n.3; Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376.
1118 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4; Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95; 07sreal, 237 F.34 at 1253;
Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657; Swanson, 110 F.Sd at 1188, 1188 n.3; Yartzoff; 809 F.2d at 1376.
109 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4; O'Neal, 237 F.3d at 1253; Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657;
Swanson, 110 Ead at 1188, 1188 n.3.
110 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4; 0 Neal, 287 F.3d at 1253; Dowe, 145 F.Sd at 657;
Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188, 1188 n.3.
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Foe example, in 1999, in Fenton n 111.S.A.V, hr., the United States
( tut t (11 Appeal. tor the Sixth Circuit, applying a weak proximity rule,
held that temporal proximity evidence was insufficient to establish a
prima fade causal connection.'" In Fenton, the plaintiff's employer
withdrew an allowance for the plaintiff to schedule mandatory over-
time hours before her regular shift within eight days of her complaint
about sexual harassment by a co-worker. 112
 In light of evidence that
the employer had encouraged complaints like the plaintiffs, however,
the court held eight days between protected activity and adverse ac-
tion insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie causal connec-
tion.'"
C. Case by Case Rules
Some courts have declined to adopt definitive rules regarding
temporal proximity.'" Instead, these courts have held that the appro-
priate treatment of temporal proximity depends on the context of
each case ("case by case rule"). 115
 The factors considered in making
the determination might include the length of the time interval, the
number and nature of protected activities and adverse actions, and
any additional relevant circumstances, as well as the burden shift stage
and procedural disposition of the case.'" In general, such rules are a
product of judicial attempts to reconcile distinct lines of holdings
within their own precedents rather than to choose a single rule for
temporal proximity.'" Case by case rules, as a result, generally do not
produce clear standards of proof for retaliation claims.'"
111 174 F.3d 827, 832 (6th Cir. 1999). Although Fenton involved state discrimination law,
the court analyzed the case according to federal case law and standards developed for
federal discrimination statutes. See id. at 829.
112
 See id. at 830, 832.
113 See id. at 832.
14 See Oest v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 616 (7th Cir. 2001); Hudson v. Norris,
227 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 2000); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d
Cir. 2000).
"8 See Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1051; Farrell, 206 F.3d at 279.
116
 See Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1051; Farrell 206 F.3d at 279.
17 See, e.g., Farrel& 206 F.3d at 279. "[WJe caution that this 'split' is not an inconsis-
tency in our analysis but is essentially fact-based." Id. These courts also express some of the
same concerns about the strong proximity rule approach as courts with weak proximity
rules. See Bermudez v. 'CRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Post hoc
ergo propter hoc is not enough to support a finding of retaliation—if it were, every employee
would file a charge just to get a little unemployment insurance.").
118 See Oest, 240 F.3c1 at 616; Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1051; Farrell 206 F.3d at 279, 279 n.5.
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For example, in 2000, in Hudson v. Norris, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the sufficiency of temporal
proximity to establish a prima facie case varies "depending on the cir-
cumstances" of each case. 119 In Hudson, the plaintiff alleged that his
employer retaliated against him because he had testified in a co-
worker's lawsuit against the employer.'" Within four months of his
testimony, the plaintiff was subjected to multiple adverse actions, in-
cluding two internal affairs investigations and denial of a promo-
tion. 121
 Although the court acknowledged that temporal proximity is
"generally not enough" to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, it
held temporal proximity sufficient to do so in Hudson.' 22
III. THE ELEMENTS OF A TEMPORAL PROXIMITY RULE
Several fundamental issues determine the relative strength of a
jurisdiction's proximity rule: the court's definition of temporal prox-
imity, its assessment of the sufficiency of temporal proximity for estab-
lishing a prima facie case, the weight it gives temporal proximity at
summary judgment, and its treatment of the knowledge require-
ment. 123
 Individually, these issues define the way in which temporal
proximity is evaluated at a particular point in the litigation of a re-
taliation claim. 124 Collectively, they indicate a court's attitude towards
temporal proximity and determine the category into which a court's
rule fits. 125
A. Defining Temporal Proximity
The foundational element of a temporal proximity rule is its
definition of temporal proximity. 126
 Determining the length of time
that constitutes temporal proximity is essential to determining its ap-
", 227 F.3d at 1051.
no Id. at 104950.
121
 Id. at 1051.
122 Id.
125
	 infra notes 126-238 and accompanying text.
I" See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000).
125 See supra notes 90-122 and accompanying text.
126 See Charles A. Shanor, Preventing and Defending Against Retaliation Claims, A.L.I.-
A.B.A. Course of Study, Advanced Employment Law & Litigation 547, 586-91 (Dec. 2,
1999) (discussing generally length of time that courts have found constituted temporal
proximity).
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propriate treatment in retaliation claims.'" But courts have not
adopted bright line standards for defining temporal proximity. 128 For
example, in Clark County School District v. Breeden, the Supreme Court
of the United States accepted the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit's definition of temporal proximity as "very close"
timing between protected activity and adverse action.'" Similarly,
lower federal courts consider the timing of adverse action to be pro-
bative of retaliation, and therefore to constitute temporal proximity,
only in relation to the circumstances of a particular claim. 130
Courts with strong proximity rules, however, can be distinguished
somewhat from those with weak proximity rules by their definitions of
temporal proximity."' Courts with strong proximity rules define tem-
poral proximity as a short time interval between protected activity and
adverse action. 132
 This standard is commonly stated as adverse action
"close in time" to protected activity or "within a reasonable period of
thne."133
 In the absence of a bright line, however, this standard re-
quires an analysis of what might reasonably be considered "close" un-
der the circumstances of a particular case. 134 Courts with strong prox-
imity rules consider a range of intervals from as short as a few minutes
127 See, e.g., O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001) (dis-
tinguishing precedents in which one-and-one-half months constituted sufficient temporal
proximity but three months did not).
128 See, e.g., Oest v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 616 (7th Cir. 2001) ("A mechanisti-
cally applied time frame would ill serve our obligation to be faithful to the legislative pur-
pose of Title VII.").
129 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001). The Court, however, did not expressly adopt the Tenth
Circuit's definition. See id.
I" See, e.g., Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; see also Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that temporal proximity depends on the circumstances of each case); Bro-
detski v. Duffey, 199 F.R.D. 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that courts have not adopted
bright line standard for temporal proximity).
181
 Compare, e.g., Warren v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 00-3560, 2001 WL 1216979,
at *4 (6th Cir. 2001) (requiring "very close" temporal proximity), with Passantino v. John-
son & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th Cir. 2000) (defining stan-
dard as 'within a reasonable period of time").
132 See Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 2001); Passantino, 212 F.3d at
507; Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1994).
182
 Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507 ("within a reasonable period of time"); Wyatt, 35 F.3(1 at
16 ("close in time"); see also Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217 (defining standard as "closely followed in
time").
154 See Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507; Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16.
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to as long as a few months sufficiently close to constitute temporal
proximity.'"
Courts adopting weak proximity rules are more restrictive in
defining temporal proximity.'" For example, in 2001, in Warren v.
Ohio Department of Public Safety, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that only
a "very close" interval constitutes temporal proximity and, therefore, is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case.'" The court cited precedent
in which an interval as short as two months was insufficient alone to
establish a prima facie causal connection.'" Similarly, in 2001, in
O'Neal v. Ferguson Construction Co., the Tenth Circuit held that addi-
tional evidence is required to establish a prima facie causal connec-
tion when temporal proximity is not "very close."'" The court noted
that it had previously held three months alone insufficient evidence
of temporal proximity.' 4°
Courts with case by case rules display the most range in defining
temporal proximity. 141 In some cases, these courts evaluate the timing
of protected activity on a sliding scale, allowing for varying degrees of
temporal proximity. 142 For example, in 2001, in Oest v. Illinois Depart-
ment of Corrections, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit linked the probative value of a time interval to the length of
the interval. 145 Yet, like jurisdictions with other types of proximity
rules, the court provided no explicit means of determining the ap-
propriate weight to accord a given length of time.'" Other courts with
case by case rules, in contrast, severely restrict the definition of tem-
poral proximity. 145 For example, in 2000, in Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers
Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
135 See Holava-Brown v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 98-9661, 1999 WL 642966, at *4 (2d Cir.
1999) (less than three months sufficient); Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16 (finding protected activity
and adverse action almost simultaneous).
196 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4; O'Neal, 237 F.3d at 1253.
127 2001 WL 1216979, at *4 (emphasis added).
198 Id. (citing Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1999)).
122 237 F.3d at 1253 (emphasis added).
10 Id. (citing Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999)).
The court also declined to rule whether the time frame of approximately two-and-one-half
months in °Neal constituted evidence of temporal proximity. See id.
141 See Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1051; Farrell, 206 F.3d at 279.
142 See Oest, 240 F.3d at 616.
143 See id. 'The inference of causation weakens as the lime between the protected ex-
pression and the adverse action increases, and then 'additional proof of a causal in.mt,
necessary.'" Id. (quoting Davidson v. Alielclfort Cluck. 1.111.. 133 F.3(1 Pr). 7∎ 1 1 t 7111 4 11
1998)).
14 '1 See id..
113 See Farrell, 2011 F.311 :it 280.
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a time interval does not constitute temporal proximity evidence un-
less it is "unusually suggestive."'" In any court, however, a retaliation
claim will fail at the outset if the plaintiff's only evidence of a causal
connection is a time interval that fails to meet the standard for tem-
poral proximity. 147
B. The First Hurdle: The Sufficiency of Temporal Proximity
for the Prima Fade Case
The second distinction among courts with different types of
proximity rules is their evaluation of the sufficiency of temporal prox-
imity for establishing a prima facie case.'" As previously noted, tem-
poral proximity is often a plaintiff's only evidence of a causal connec-
tion. 149
 Courts with strong proximity rules generally hold temporal
proximity alone sufficient to establish a prima facie causal connec-
601055
 For example, in 1999, in Holava-Brown v. General Electric Co.,
the Second Circuit held that temporal proximity constituted sufficient
circumstantial evidence of a causal connection to establish a prima
facie case. 151
 In Holava -Brown, approximately two months had passed
between the plaintiffs complaint about sexual harassment by a co-
worker and notification by the plaintiffs supervisor that she would be
dismissed when her contact ended.' 52
 The court held that a two-
month interval was sufficiently probative of a causal connection and,
therefore, required no additional evidence for the burden of produc-
tion to shift to the defendant. 155
Initially, weak proximity rules appear very similar to strong prox-
imity rules in evaluating the sufficiency of temporal proximity at the
prima facie stage.154
 In at least some circumstances, courts with weak
146 Id. (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)).
147 See, e.g., Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 110-11 (1st Cir, 1988) (con-
chiding retaliation claim failed because eighteen months had passed between plaintiff's
EEOC complaint and firing).
148 See Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1051; Holava-Brown, 1999 WL 642966, at *4; Swanson v.
Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997).
lo See Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257; Essary & Friedman, supra note 8, at 143;
Sandler & Brewer, supra note 8, at 119.
00 See Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 242 F.3d 996, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 2001); Passan-
lino, 212 F.3d at 507; Holava-Brown, 1999 WL 642966, at *3; Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16; Mitchell v.
Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
151
 1999 WL 642966, at *3.
'"14
. 
at
 4.1, "4 .
153 See id. at *3, *4.
154 Compare Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001), with Bass, 242
F.3d at 1015-16.
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proximity rules have held that temporal proximity alone may be
sufficient to establish a prima facie causal connection. 155 For example,
in 2001 in Evans 14 City of Houston, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that five days between the plaintiffs appear-
ance at a co-worker's grievance hearing and his being recommended
for demotion was sufficient evidence of a causal connection to estab-
lish a prima fade case.156
 The Fifth Circuit recognized the fundamen-
tal probative value of temporal proximity, reasoning that adverse ac-
tion taken so soon after protected activity raises an inference of a
causal connection. 157
Under some weak proximity rules, however, temporal proximity
may not suffice to establish a prima facie case. 158 For example, in'
1997, in Swanson v. General Services Administration, the Fifth Circuit
stated that temporal proximity alone is not always sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie causal connection. 155
 The court noted that the
plaintiff had engaged in protected activities throughout his employ-
ment.'" The court expressed concern that allowing temporal proxim-
ity establish a prima facie case per se would encourage employees to
seek job protection by regularly engaging in unnecessary protected
activities. 161
Compared to courts with strong proximity rules, those with weak
proximity rules, like the Fifth Circuit, reflect a different understand-
ing of a plaintiff's burden at the prima facie stage.'" Courts with
strong proximity rules recognize the prima fade burden as lower, if
not significantly lower, than the ultimate burden of proof. 163 Some
courts with weak proximity rules, however, blur the distinction be-
tween these two burdens.164
 In 1998, in Dowe v. Total Action Against
Poverty in Roanoke Valley, the United States Court of Appeals for the
155 See Evans, 246 F.3d at 354.
166 Id.
157 See id.
155 See Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3.
159 Id.
too Id.
151 See id. The court's concern in Swanson ignored the requirement that a plaintiff does
not succeed in a retaliation claim merely by establishing a prima facie case. See id. A plain-
tiff who has successfully established a prima facie case must still meet the burden at the
pretext stage to prove retaliation. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
162 Compare Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3, with Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16.
165 See Bass, 242 F.3d at 1015-16; Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507; Holava-Brown, 1999 WL
642966, at *3; Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16; Mitchell 759 F.2d at 86.
164 See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d at 653,656-57
(4th Cir. 1998); Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3.
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Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
by a preponderance of the evidence. 165
 Although later in the case the
court described the plaintiff's prima facie burden as "less onerous"
than the ultimate burden, the court seemed to require the same level
of proof to establish a prima facie case as is necessary to prove the ul-
timate issue of retaliation. 166
 Moreover, the court appeared to require
more proof than those courts with strong proximity rules that have
described the prima facie burden as "de minimis."167
In 2000, in Harris v. King, the Sixth Circuit likewise limited the
sufficiency of temporal proximity for the prima facie case by diminish-
ing the distinction between the prima facie burden and the ultimate
burden of proof. 168 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, however, the court did
not qualify its assessment of the plaintiffs prima facie burden. 169 The
Sixth Circuit further stated that "no one factor is dispositive" in estab-
lishing a prima facie causal connection and that temporal proximity is
merely "relevant" to determining such a connection, 170
165 145 F.3d at 656.
la See id. at 657.
167 See id. at 656-57. The Supreme Court discussed the prima fade and ultimate bur-
dens at length in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. See 509 U.S. 502, 509-11 (1993). The
Court stated that a plaintiff must prove a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Id. at 506. The Court further noted, however, that a plaintiff must meet this burden
in order to prevail ultimately in a claim, not to establish a prima facie case per se. See id. at
510 n.3; see also Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) ("At the summary
judgment stage, the prima facie case need not be proved by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."); Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 86 (noting that the ultimate burden of persuasion "[lily
definition ... cannot also be the threshold test of what a plaintiff must show to make out a
prima facie case of reprisal.").
This treatment of the prima fade burden occasionally confuses the very courts that
adhere to it. See Norman v. Rubin, No. 99-1231, 1999 WL 739433, at *2 (4th Cir. 1999).
For example, in 1999, in Norman v. Rabin, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Dowe to support
the proposition that temporal proximity alime cannot establish a prima facie case, despite
an explicit statement in Dowe to the contrary. See id. (citing Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657). Accord-
ing to the Dowe court, "evidence that the alleged adverse action occurred shartly after the
employer became aware of the protected activity is sufficient to 'satisf [y] the less onerous
burden of making a prima facie case of caus[ation]'." Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657 (quoting Wil-
liams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989)).
1138 See Harris v. King, No. 98-5826, 2000 WL 353676, at *2-3 (Gth Cir. 2000). "(T] he
employee must produce sufficient evidence that the adverse action would not have been
taken had the employee not engaged in the protected activity." Id. at *3.
169 See id. at *2-3. The Sixth Circuit had previously noted that the prima facie burden
is "easily met." Wrenn v. Could, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1987).
17° See Harris, 2000 WL 353676, at *3, Similarly, in 1999, in Stein v. Kent State University,
the Sixth Circuit held that temporal proximity may only "bolster" a causal connection and
may not itself support an inference of such a connection. See No. 98-3278, 1999 WL
357752, at *7 (Gth Cir. 1999). Although the Sixth Circuit had held previously that temporal
proximity may suffice to establish a prima facie causal connection, the Harris court, too,
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Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has incorporated a significant
qualification into its rule that temporal proximity may be sufficient to
establish a prima facie case.'" The court has held that temporal prox-
imity alone does not suffice in the face of compelling evidence that
the defendant encouraged protected activity. 172
 If the defendant pres-
ents evidence of such encouragement during the plaintiff's prima fa-
cie case, even before the burden shift occurs, then the prima facie
case fails. 172
 Although some courts with strong proximity rules allow
the particular context of a case to defeat a prima facie case based
solely on temporal proximity, they have not expressly incorporated
such a qualification into their standards for establishing a prima facie
case. 174
Similar to courts with weak proximity rules, courts with case by
case rules significantly limit the sufficiency of temporal proximity for
establishing a prima facie casual connection.'" Courts with case by
case rules provide few explicit standards for determining the appro-
priate weight of temporal proximity at the prima facie stage.'" In-
stead, such jurisdictions identify the entire prima facie causal connec-
tion as a reasonableness inquiry. 177
 Courts with case by case rules
reason that temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case if it raises a reasonable inference of a causal connection in the
context of a particular case. 178
Like the definition of temporal proximity, determining its
sufficiency for establishing a prima facie causal connection is crucial
seemed to require something more than courts with strong proximity rules adhering to a
"de minimis" prima facie burden. See 2000 WL 353676, at *3; see also Moon v. Transp. Driv-
ers, Inc., 836 F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir. 1987) ("proximity ... may give rise to an inference of
a causal connection").
171 See Moon, 836 F.2d at 229 .
172 See id. In 1987, in Moon v. T•ansport Drivers, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held temporal
proximity insufficient for a truck driver to establish a causal connection in light of evi-
dence that the employer encouraged complaints about safety issues. See id.; see also Fenton
v. HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 832 (6th Cir. 1999) (following the rule in Moon).
173 See Moon, 836 F.2d at 229. This qualification may be the source of holdings in more
recent Sixth Circuit cases that limit the possibility that temporal proximity alone can estab-
lish a prima facie causal connection. See Harris, 2000 WL 353676, at *3; Stein, 1999 WL
357752, at *7.
174 See Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1997).
178
 See Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1051; Farrell 206 F.3d at 279, 280.
178 See °est, 240 F.3d at 616; Hudson, 227 F.Sd at 1051; Farrel{ 206 F.3d at 279, 280.
177 See °est, 240 F.3d at 616; Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1051; Farrell 206 F.3d at 279, 280.
178 See ()est, 240 F.3d at 616; Hudson, 227 F.Sd at 1051; Farrell 206 F.3d at 279, 280.
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allnwing a Ietaliaiilln t him to 1)1 oceed. 17q If a plaintiff cannot es-
taltii.11 a i ► t ima I.it is taw, the harden will lint shift to the defendant
and the t laini will WO" For plaintiffs whose only evidence of a causal
connection is a time interval, the sufficiency of temporal proximity at
the prima fade stage may make or break the entire retaliation
claim. 181
C. The Second Hurdle: Temporal Proximity & Summary Judgment
Some courts with strong proximity rules have held temporal
proximity sufficient not only for establishing a prima facie case, but
also for ultimately proving a retaliation claim. 182
 These courts have
held that temporal proximity can create a genuine issue of material
fact for the jury by raising an inference of pretext. 188
 Without such an
inference, a plaintiffs retaliation claim fails because the plaintiff has
not met the burden of producing sufficient evidence of pretext under
the burden shift.'" If the plaintiff cannot produce sufficient evidence
that the defendant's stated, non-retaliatory reasons for adverse action
are pretextual, then the defendant will win a motion for summary
judgment. 188 If temporal proximity is considered sufficient evidence
to prove pretext, however, then plaintiffs armed only with temporal
proximity evidence of a causal connection are able to get their retalia-
tion claim to a jury. 186
For example, in 1996, in Strother v. Southern California Permanente
Medical Group, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of re-
taliation. 187 In Strother, one day passed between the plaintiff's filing of
a claim of race and gender discrimination and her replacement as
personal physician coordinator. 188
 The defendant, however, offered a
variety of non-retaliatory reasons for this and other adverse actions. 189
The Ninth Circuit stated that a prima facie case is, in itself, in-
179 See, e.g., Farrell, 206 F.Sd at 279 n.5 (declining to decide whether a three to four
week interval would be sufficient alone to establish a prima facie causal connection).
191) See Kahan & Deem, supra note 1, at 435.
181 see id.
182 See Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507.
183 See id.
184
 See Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
'as See Soileau, 105 F.Sd at 16-17.
106 See Passantino, 212 F.Sd at 507.
187 See generally 79 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1996).
145 See id. at 864, 869-70.
188 See id. at 870.
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sufficient to raise a genuine issue for the fact-finder.'" The court rea-
soned, however, that the same evidence that establishes a prima fade
case, if it is strong enough, might also create a genuine issue of pre-
text for the jury.'91
 The court concluded that temporal proximity is
sufficient to get a case to the jury "even in the face of' the defendant's
evidence of non-retaliatory motives. 192
Other courts with strong proximity rules, however, have not gone
so far.'" Some give substantial weight to temporal proximity but still
enable summary judgment resolution of cases in which temporal
proximity is the sole evidence of a causal connection. 194
 These courts
consider temporal proximity more in the context of other evidence in
the record, reasoning that other evidence may outweigh temporal
proximity, even when temporal proximity is viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. 195
 Unlike courts with weak proximity rules,
however, these courts do not expressly require summary judgment at
the point at which temporal proximity meets evidence of non-
retaliatory motive.'"
For example, in 2001, in Cifra v. General Electric Co., the Second
Circuit held that temporal proximity alone could satisfy a plaintiffs
ultimate burden of proof of a causal connection.'" The court noted
that twenty days between protected activity and adverse action was
purely circumstantial evidence, but also noted that in ruling on a
summary judgment motion it must credit the record in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.'" Under this standard, the court held tem-
poral proximity evidence sufficient to prove pretext, and therefore, to
find the defendant liable for retaliation.'" In 2001, in Slattery v. Swiss
Reinsurance America Corp., however, the Second Circuit held temporal
proximity insufficient in the factual context of the case to meet the
plaintiffs ultimate burden of proof of a causal connection. 2" In Slat-
tery, the plaintiff alleged that he had been put on probation and later
199 Id.
191 Id.
192 See id.; see also Sandoval v. Rubin, No. 98-56831, 2000 WI, 1643941, at *1 (9th Cir.
2000); Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507 (citing Strother, 79 F.3d at 870-.71).
193 See Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590-92 (11th Cir. 2000); Soileau, 105
F.3d at 16-17.
194 See Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16-17.
195 See id.
199 See id.
197 See 252 F.3d at 217.
Igo Id. at 217-18.
1" See id. at 218.
2139 See 248 F.3d at 95.
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terminated because he had filed an EEOC complaint of age discrimi-
nation."' In considering the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, the court evaluated evidence that the adverse action was part of
an extended disciplinary process. 202
 Considering this other evidence,
the Second Circuit held that temporal proximity was not sufficient for
a rational jury to find for the plaintiff. 2"
Unlike courts with strong proximity rules, courts with weak prox-
imity rules generally have held temporal proximity alone insufficient
for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment. 204 Under the burden
shift, therefore, a plaintiff needs additional evidence of pretext to re-
but a defendant's proffered non-retaliatory reason or reasons for ad-
verse action.20 For example, in 1997, in Conner v. Schnuck Markets, Inc.,
the Tenth Circuit emphasized that the inference of a causal connec-
tion at the prima facie stage "drops from the case" once the defen-
dant has offered a non-retaliatory rationale for the adverse action. 206
Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Strother, which emphasized the potential
vitality of prima facie evidence at the pretext stage, the Tenth Circuit
emphasized the pretext stage as a distinct inquiry requiring proof, if
not evidence, separate from that employed at the prima facie stage. 207
Although they evaluate temporal proximity evidence in the con-
text of each case, courts with case by case rules are even more restric-
tive of temporal proximity at summary judgment than other courts. 208
For example, in 2000, in Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that temporal proximity generally is insufficient to create an
201 See id
"3 See id.
"3 See id.
204 See, e.g., Harris, 2000 WL 353676, at *3 ("[T)emporal proximity Wile is insufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of causation.").
2135 See id.; Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1396 (10th Cir. 1997).
I'm 121 F.3d at 1396.
207 See id.; see also Dowe, 145 F.3d at 656 (stating that prima facie case "drops from the
case" after burden shift (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255
n.10 (1981)); Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 (requiring evidence other than prima facie te ►n-
poral proximity to prove pretext). In 2000, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the
Supreme Court recognized that the prima fade presumption "drops out of the picture"
after the burden shift. 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511). The
Court held, however, that the factfinder "may still consider the evidence establishing the
plaintiff's prima facie case 'and inferences properly drawn therefrom on the issue of
whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual.'" Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255
n.10).
208 See Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., 216 F.3d 707, 716 (8th Cir. 2000); Farrell, 206
F.3d at 279 n.5; Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 1998).
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issue for the jury. 2® In Farrell, the Third Circuit went even further,
citing the limited sufficiency of temporal proximity at summary
judgment as support for its case by case rule. 21° The court noted that
the appropriate weight of temporal proximity evidence depends not
only on the "specific facts and circumstances" of a case but also on the
burden shift stage and "procedural circumstance" of the case.2 I 1
A defendant's motion for summary judgment puts a court's atti-
tude towards temporal proximity evidence in sharp focus. 2 I 2 In many
courts, a defendant's motion for summary judgment represents a
daunting if not overwhelming hurdle for plaintiffs relying on tempo-
ral proximity evidence to prove a causal connection.20 In those
courts, therefore, even the burden shift—designed to aid plaintiffs
relying substantially on circumstantial evidence—will not enable a
plaintiff to survive summary judgment resolution in the defendant's
favor. 214
D. One More Hurdle: The Knowledge Requirement
The Supreme Court's adoption of a knowledge requirement in
Breeden potentially added another hurdle to the sufficiency of tempo-
ral proximity, for both establishing a prima facie case and surviving
summary judgment. 215 The knowledge requirement derives from the
reality that an employer cannot take retaliatory action because of a pro-
tected activity of which the employer had no knowledge Y 16 Proving
retaliation, therefore, requires proof of the employer's knowledge. 2I7
Most courts, however, regardless of the type of proximity rule they
209
	 F.3d at 716; see also Bermudez, 138 F.3d at 1179 (requiring more than temporal
proximity to satisfy ultimate burden of causal connection); Johnson v. Univ. of Wis.-Eau
Claire, 70 F.3d 469, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding temporal proximity with additional
evidence may create issue for jury).
213 See 206 F.3d at 279 n.5.
211 /d.
212 Compare Harris, 2000 WL 353676, at 4'3 (weak proximity rule), with Strother, 79 F.3d
at 870 (strong proximity rule).
213 See, e.g., Bermudez, 138 F.3d at 1179.
214 See Id.; see also Smith, supra note 8, at 383 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T) he entire purpose of the McDonnell
Douglas prima fade case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional
discrimination is hard to come by.") ).
213 See 532 U.S. at 273.
216 See id,
217 See id.
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have adopted, had previously adopted the knowledge requirement in
some form and, practically, treat it in a common manner.218
Some courts with strong proximity rules require a showing of
knowledge as part of the proof of a causal connection. 219 In these
courts, temporal proximity, without a separate showing of knowledge,
fails to establish a prima facie case, let alone raise a genuine issue of a
causal connection for a jury. 22° In 1998, in Hazward v. Runyon, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia utilized such
a standard. 221 In Hazward, the plaintiff alleged he had been the sub-
ject of adverse action during the two months between filing a request
for counseling in response to alleged gender discrimination and filing
a formal complaint. 222 The plaintiff produced no evidence, however,
that his employer knew of the original request. 225
 The plaintiff, there-
fore, was unable to prove that the employer knew about the protected
activity when the adverse action occurred. 224 The court held that tem-
poral proximity, without evidence of knowledge, was insufficient to
establish a prima facie causal connection. 225 Similarly, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expressly requires a sepa-
rate showing of knowledge in its strong proximity rule. 226 Both for the
prima facie case and ultimate proof of retaliation, the First Circuit's
rule states that "the employer's knowledge of the protected activity," not
the protected activity itself, must be "close in time to the employer's
adverse action. "227
Under weak proximity rules and case by case rules, as under most
strong proximity rules, a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case
based on temporal proximity evidence without a separate showing of
knowledge.226
 The Sixth Circuit has adopted the knowledge require-
ment as a fourth element of the prima facie case, separate from the
218
 See, e.g., Dawe, 145 F.Sd at 657; Wyatt, 35 F.Sd at 16; Hazward v. Runyon, 14 F. Supp.
2d 120,124-25 (D.D.C. 1998).
218 See Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16; Hazward, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 124-25.
228
 See Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16; Hazward, 14 F. Stipp. 2d at 124-25.
221 See 14 F. Supp. 2d at 124-25.
222 See id. at 123-25.
22s Id. at 124-25.
224 Id.
225
 Id.; see also Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 86 ("The causal connection ... may be established
by showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and that
the adverse personnel action took place shortly after that activity").
I" See Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16.
227 Id. (emphasis added).
228 See Jeffries v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 99-4150,2001 WL 845486, at *4 (6th Cir.
2001) (weak proximity rule); Hazward, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 124-25 (strong proximity rule).
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causal connection. 229
 Therefore, even if a plaintiff is able to establish a
prima fade causal connection based on temporal proximity, the
prima facie case fails without a separate showing of knowledge."° The
Fourth Circuit, in contrast, has incorporated knowledge into the
causal connection requirement, but still requires a separate showing
of knowledge."' In practice, there is no difference between the two
approaches—both require a separate showing of knowledge. 232
Not every jurisdiction, however, requires a separate showing of
knowledge per se.233
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit has integrated the knowledge requirement into a single
required showing of a causal connection. 234
 The Eleventh Circuit has
reasoned that proving knowledge is part of proving a causal connec-
tion.235
 Temporal proximity, therefore, imputes knowledge of pro-
tected activity to an employer in the same way that it raises an infer-
ence of a causal connection.236
 As a result, the court has held that a
plaintiff may prove both knowledge and a causal connection circum-
stantially using the same temporal proximity evidence. 237 The court,
therefore, allows a plaintiff with no direct evidence of knowledge or a
causal connection other than temporal proximity to survive a defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment and, potentially, to win a jury
verdict of retaliation.""
W. SHAPING A SINGLE RULE FOR TEMPORAL PROXIMITY
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, temporal proximity
receives different treatment in different jurisdictions. 239
 Even those
courts that share one type of rule for temporal proximity often differ
in their specific definitions or applications of that rule. 24° Determin-
229 SeeJeffries, 2001 WL 845486, at *4.
"° See id.
2" See Dowe, 145 F.3d at 656-57. In Dowe, the court described this showing as "abso-
lutely necessary" to establish a prima facie case. Id.
52 SeeJeffries, 2001 WL 845486, at *4; Dante, 145 F.3d at 656-57.
2" See Bass, 242 F.3d at 1015.
"4 See id.
"5 See id.
236 See id.
2" See id.
258 See Bass, 242 F.3d at 1015.
239 See, e.g., Ellis & Rudder, supra note 8, at 257.
24°
 Compare, e.g., Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 242 F.3d 996,1015 (11th Cir. 2001)
(allowing temporal proximity evidence as circumstantial evidence of knowledge), with
Hazwani, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 124-25 (requiring showing of knowledge separate from tempo-
ral proximity).
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ing an appropriate single standard for temporal proximity evidence,
therefore, depends on an analysis of the specific elements of temporal
proximity rules as identified in Part 111. 241
Such an analysis produces a single, optimal standard for temporal
proximity. 242 This standard borrows elements from the temporal prox-
imity rules in a number of jurisdictions and is basically a strong prox-
imity rule.245
 According to this standard, courts should define tempo-
ral proximity as adverse action close in time to protected activity. 244 In
addition, courts should recognize the sufficiency of temporal proxim-
ity evidence to establish a prima facie causal connection. 245 Depend-
ing on the circumstances of a particular case, courts should also rec-
ognize the sufficiency of temporal proximity evidence for ultimate
proof of a causal connection at the summary judgment stage. 246
 Fi-
nally, courts should incorporate the approach of the Eleventh Circuit
to the knowledge requirement, merging it with the causal connection
requirement into one element of proof of retaliation for which tem-
poral proximity is sufficient. 247
A. Defining Temporal Proximity
Formulating a single rule for temporal proximity first requires
defining temporal proximity. 2" Courts provide a variety of alterna-
tives.249 Despite the variation, however, some elements are common to
sot See supra notes 123-238 and accompanying text.
VII See infra notes 248-392 and accompanying text.
242 See Bass, 242 F.3d at 1015-16; Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prod.,
Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th Cir. 2000); Holava-Brown v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 98-9661, 1999
WL 642966, at *4 (2d Cir. 1999); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 110-11 (1st
Cir. 1988); Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
244 See infra notes 248-283 and accompanying text.
242 See infra notes 284-328 and accompanying text.
2441 See infra notes 329-362 and accompanying text.
242 See infra notes 363-392 and accompanying text.
"a See Warren v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 00-3560, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4 (6th
Cir. 2001) ("very close"); Oest v. 111. Dep't of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 616 (7th Cir. 2001)
(defining temporal proximity on a sliding scale); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d
271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) ("'unusually suggestive'" (quoting Krouse v. Amer. Sterilizer Co.,
126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)); Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507 ("within a reasonable period
of time").
"9 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4 ("very close"); OM, 240 F.3d at 616 (defining
temporal proximity on a sliding scale); Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280 ("'unusually suggestive'"
(quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503)); Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507 ("within a reasonable period
of time").
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each definition.260
 Considering both the common and varying ele-
ments of each definition, the optimal definition for temporal proxim-
ity is adverse action close in time to protected activity. 251
In general, regardless of the type of temporal proximity rule em-
ployed, each court's standard for temporal proximity requires that the
protected activity be, to some extent, close in time to the adverse ac-
tion.252
 Moreover, each requires that the time interval indicate, by it-
self, some degree of causal connection to be considered probative of
retaliation. 255 Also, each courts' standard is essentially a reasonable-
ness inquiry, probing whether the time interval might reasonably be
probative of retaliation in the circumstances of a given case. 254 Most
significantly, no court has adopted a bright line standard for defining
temporal proximity. 255
A bright line standard is ill-suited to temporal proximity evi-
dence.256
 Although such a standard might provide uniformity to Title
VII retaliation litigation, it would also be impractical, given the con-
text-specific nature of temporal proximity evidence. 257 A time interval
of a particular length may be probative of retaliation in the circum-
stances of one case but not in the circumstances of another. 268 Moreo-
ver, a bright line rule could defeat the purpose of anti-retaliation pro-
tection. 259
 For example, it might encourage employers harboring
2" See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4; Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Farrel{ 206 F.3d at 280;
Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507.
"I See Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1994) (utilizing "close in time"
standard).
252 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4; Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280;
Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507.
253 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4; Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280;
Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507.
254 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4; Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280;
Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507.
"5 See Jeffries v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 99-4150, 2001 WL 845486, at *4 (6th Cir.
2001); Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 2001); Bass, 242 F.3d at 1015-16
(Eleventh Circuit); Oest, 240 F.3d at 616 (Seventh Circuit); O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co.,
237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001); Sandoval v. Rubin, No. 98-56831, 2000 WL 1643941,
at *1 (9th Cir. 2000); Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 2000); Farrell, 206
F.3d at 279 (Third Circuit); Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145
F.34 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998); Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir.
1997); Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16 (First Circuit); Brodetski v. Duffey, 199 F.R.D. 14, 20 (D.D.C.
2001).
156 Oest, 240 F.3d at 616 ("A mechanistically applied time frame would ill serve our ob-
ligation to be faithful to the legislative purpose of Title VII.").
257 See id.
"5 See id.
259 See id.
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retaliatory motives merely to delay adverse action until the length of
time defined by the standard had passed. 26° The employer could thus
deny an employee use of temporal proximity evidence in establishing
a prima facie case of retaliation. 261
 Conversely, a bright line standard
might encourage employees to attempt to insulate themselves from
legitimate, non-retaliatory adverse action by regularly engaging in
needless protected activity. 262
 Therefore, any adverse action would oc-
cur within the period of time defined as probative of retaliation. 268
The same concerns apply, to some extent, to the reasonableness
standards that courts currently employ. 2" Shrewd employees or pa-
tient but retaliatory employers might still manipulate the timing of
their protected activity or adverse action to their advantage. 265
 Avoid-
ing this outcome to the extent possible, however, appears to be the
central rationale for use of a reasonableness standard. 266 The circum-
stances of any particular case enable a reasonable assessment of the
time interval within the context of the case. 267
 Therefore, a reason-
ableness standard is better suited to weighing temporal proximity
than the bright line alternative. 268
The next step, then, is defining the terms of an appropriate rea-
sonableness standard for temporal proximity. 269
 Although courts gen-
erally adopt similar definitions of temporal proximity, the terms em-
ployed differ in their restrictions on the length of time that can be
considered evidence of temporal proxhnity. 270
 For example, courts
*to See Shanor, supra note 126, at 586 (citing Goutu v. Martin County Bd. of Comm'rs,
47 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that the absence of adverse action within
the time interval considered temporally proximate negates inference of retaliation)).
Some courts give considerable weight to a lack of temporal proximity, allowing it essen-
tially to defeat a retaliation claim despite other evidence of a causal connection. See Oest,
240 F.3d at 616 (citing Johnson v. Univ. of Wis.-Eau Claire, 70 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir.
1995)); Dowe, 145 FM at 657.
261
 See Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657 (noting negative incentives associated with bright line
rule).
R62 Id.
263 See id.
"4 See Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657,
24' See Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657.
216 See Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657.
"7 See Oest, 240 F.34 at 616; Owe, 145 F.3d at 657.
268 See Oest, 240 F.34 at 616; Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657.
2123 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4 ("very close"); Oest, 240 F.3d at 616 (defining
temporal proximity on a sliding scale); Farrell 206 F.3d at 280 ( -unusually suggestive"'
(quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503)); Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507 ("within a reasonable period
of dine").
270 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4 ("very close"); Oest, 240 F.3d at 616 (defining
temporal proximity on a sliding scale); Farrell, 206 F.3(1 at 280 ("'unusually suggestive'"
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with strong proximity rules generally require only that adverse action
be "close" in time to protected activity, or that the interval between
the two be "reasonable."2" Alternatively, courts with weak proximity
rules generally require that the two be "very close."272 Although courts
with case by case rules have not adopted common standards, at least
one such jurisdiction uses even more restrictive language, requiring
that the interval be "unusually suggestive."273
The difference among these definitions might be largely seman-
tic. 274
 It is not necessarily certain that courts with weak proximity rules
are significantly more restrictive per se in applying their definitions of
temporal proximity than courts with strong proximity rules. 275
 The
difference, to the extent that there is one, is significant more because
it reflects broader differences between courts with different types of
proximity rules. 276
 It is more a differ6nce of attitude than applica-
tion.277
 Courts define their standards in terms that reflect the weight
they assign to temporal proximity, even though their interpretations
of what evidence constitutes temporal proximity may be essentially
the same. 278
 Courts that give more weight to temporal proximity evi-
dence—those with strong proximity rules—define temporal proximity
more expansively.279 Courts that give less weight to temporal proxim-
(quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503)); Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507 ("within a reasonable period
of time").
271 See Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217 ("closely followed in time"); Bass, 242 F.Sd at 1016
("close"); Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507 ("within a reasonable period of time"); Wyatt, 35 F.Sd
at 16 ("close in time").
272 Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4; 0 7Veal, 237 F.3d at 1253 (emphasis added).
275 Farrel4 206 F.3d at 280 (emphasis added) (quoting 'Crouse, 126 F.3d at 503).
"4 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4 ("very close"); Oest, 240 F.Sd at 616 (defining
temporal proximity on a sliding scale); Farrell 206 F.3d at 280 ("`unusually suggestive"'
(quoting Krause, 126 F.3d at 503)); Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507 ("within a reasonable period
of time").
275 Compare, e.g., ()Neal, 237 F.3d at 1253 (noting precedent that held three months
not "very close" and therefore not sufficient evidence of temporal proximity, but one and
one-half months "very close" and therefore sufficient), with Holava-Brown, 1999 WL
642966, at *4 (holding less than three months "close" and therefore sufficient). For a gen-
eral discussion of the lengths of time considered evidence of temporal proximity by differ-
ent courts, see Shanor, supra note 126, at 586-94; see also Timing of Adverse Actions, in EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR § 20,947 (2001).
276 See, e.g., O'Neal, 237 F.3d at 1253; Holava-Brown, 1999 WL 642966, at *4.
2" See, e.g., ONeal, 237 F.3d at 1253; Holava-Brown, 1999 WL 642966, at *4.
I" See, e.g., O Neal 237 F.3d at 1253; Holava-Brown, 1999 WL 642966, at *4.
272 See Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217 ("closely followed in time"); Bass, 242 F.3d at 1016
("close"); Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507 ("within a reasonable period of time"); Wyatt, 35 F.ad
at 16 ("close in time").
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ity—those with weak proximity rules—define it more narrowly. 280
Likewise, at least one court with a case by case rule has declined to
define temporal proximity. 281
 Therefore, determining the most ap-
propriate definition for temporal proximity requires a determination
of the optimal weight that courts should give temporal proximity evi-
dence.252
 As the following discussion indicates, a strong proximity rule
definition, requiring simply that protected activity and adverse action
be close in time, probably provides both an appropriate, workable
standard and the flexibility necessary to apply it.283
B. Sufficiency for the Prima Fade Case
Most courts recognize at least some circumstances under which
temporal proximity alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie causal
connection.284 One of the central differences among courts with dif-
ferent types of proximity rules, however, is their restrictions on those
circumstances.285
 Courts with strong proximity rules generally hold
that temporal proximity alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case. 286
 In contrast, courts with weak proximity rules restrict the po-
tential sufficiency of temporal proximity for establishing a prima facie
case.287
 Courts with case by case rules, by definition, determine the
sufficiency of temporal proximity evidence according to the facts of
each case. 288
 Although each of the alternatives represents different
concerns about the scope of Title VII and the role of the burden shift
288 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4 ("very close"); O'Neal 237 F.3d at 1253 ("very
close").
251 See Oest, 240 F.3d at 616.
2R1 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *4 ("very close"); Oest, 240 F.3d at 616 (defining
temporal proximity on a sliding scale); Farrell 206 F.3d at 280 ("'unusually suggestive'"
(quoting Krouse, 126 F.Sd at 503)); Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507 ("within a reasonable period
of time").
283 See infra notes 284-362 and accompanying text.
t134
 See, e.g., Cam, 252 F.3d at 217-18 (strong proximity rule); Evans v. City of Houston,
246 F.Sd 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001) (weak proximity rule); Farrell 206 F.3d at 279 (case by
case rule).
288 See, e.g., Cifra, 252 F.3(1 at 217-18 (strong proximity rule); Evans, 246 E3d at 354
(weak proximity rule); Farrell 206 E3d at 279 (case by case rule).
283
 See, e.g., Cifra, 252 F.3d at 218; see also supra notes 148-181 and accompanying text
(discussing sufficiency for prima facie case).
287
 See, e.g., Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3; see also supra notes 148-181 and accompany-
ing text (discussing sufficiency for prima facie case).
283
 See, e.g., Farrell, 206 F.3d at 279; see also supra notes 148-181 and accompanying text
(discussing sufficiency for prima facie case).
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in retaliation claims, an appropriately defined strong proximity rule
could successfully meet all of these concerns. 289
A strong proximity rule best serves the purpose of the burden
shift. 29° The burden shift "is intended progressively to sharpen the
inquiry into the elusive factual question" of retaliation."' It achieves
this progression by creating an intermediate burden of production at
the prima facie case stage that is "not onerous" and requires the plain-
tiff merely to establish an inference of retaliation. 292 In the absence of
any other evidence, temporal proximity creates such an inference. 295
Adverse action taken soon after protected activity creates an inference
of a causal connection between the two events. 294 Indeed, most courts,
regardless of the type of proximity rule they have adopted, recognize
at least some circumstances in which temporal proximity alone
suffices to establish a prima facie causal connection. 295 Although tem-
poral proximity is itself not conclusive proof of a causal connection,
such proof is not required to establish a prima facie case.296
A strong proximity rule for the prima facie case, however, raises a
significant concern.297
 A strong proximity rule enables an employee to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, even in response to purely
legitimate adverse action.298
 Allowing mere temporal proximity to es-
tablish a prima facie causal connection, therefore, might encourage
employees to engage in frivolous protected activity ' regularly. 29
Moreover, a strong proximity rule requires employers to defend any
adverse action taken against an employee who has recently engaged
259 See Cifra, 252 F.3d at 218; Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95
(2d Cir. 2001).
293 See Cifra, 252 F.3d at 218; Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95.
2 See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 n.8 (1981) (referring to
discrimination claims rather than retaliation claims).
"2 Id. at 253-54; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see
also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 526 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (de-
scribing the relationship of the burden shift to the purpose of Title VII).
293
 See Oliver; 846 F.2d at 110 ("A showing of discharge soon after the employee en-
gages in an activity specifically protected ... is indirect proof of a causal connection be-
tween the firing and the activity because it is strongly suggestive of retaliation.").
294 See id.
295 See, e.g., Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217-18 (strong proximity rule); Evans, 246 F.3d at 354
(weak proximity rule); Farrell 206 F.3d at 279 (case by case rule).
296
 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
2" See Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir. 1998); Dour, 145
F.3d at 657; Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3.
298 See Bermudez, 138 F.3d at 1179; Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657; Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3.
299
 See Bermudez, 138 F.3d at 1179; Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657; Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3.
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in a protected activity, regardless of its validity. 3°° Indeed, this argu-
ment has been persuasive to courts adopting a weak proximity rule or
case by case rule analysis of the prima facie case requirement." 1
The argument falters, however, for two reasons. 3D2 First, the in-
termediate burden of the prima facie case is intentionally more easily
met than the ultimate burden. 303
 An employee who cannot prove re-
taliation often may be able to establish a prima facie case. 304 There-
fore, the burden shift may encourage employees to file retaliation
claims that cannot be proven. 305
 The establishment of a burden that is
"not onerous" for raising an inference of retaliation, however, is sim-
ply a necessary cost of the expanded access to Title VII protection that
the burden shift is intended to provide. 3°6
The second reason the weak proximity rule argument should ul-
timately fail is an extension of the first. 307
 Because the ultimate bur-
den is higher than the prima facie burden, proving retaliation under
the burden shift requires more than establishing a prima facie case. 308
For example, under a strong proximity rule, an employee with a frivo-
lous retaliation claim could establish a prima facie case based solely
on temporal proximity. 309
 Once the burden shifts, however, the le-
gitimacy of the adverse action comes into focus.")
 If the employer
cannot state a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse ac-
tion, the employee will win." )
 But, if the employer can state such a
reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that reason
pretextual. 312
 If the employee cannot, then the employee's retaliation
claim fails.'" A frivolous retaliation claim, therefore, will likely fail
511° See Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3; see also Smith, supra note 8, at 391-92 (asserting
need for sufficient proof of claim under burden shift to prevent Title VII being trans-
formed into a statute requiring just cause for employment decisions.").
"I See Bermudez, 138 F.Sd at 1179; Dowe, 145 F.Sd at 657; Swanson, 110 F.Sd at 1188 n.3.
"I See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
"3 See id.
"4 See, e.g., Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95 (finding claim failed despite timing sufficient to es-
tablish prima facie causal connection).
"5 See Smith, supra note 8, at 377-78.
"6 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
"I See id.
"5 See id.
"5
 See Swanson, 110 F.3d at 1188 n.3 (noting concern for frivolous cases); Smith, supra
note 8, at 377-78.
no See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
6" See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509,510 n.3; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
512
 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
515 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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despite the sufficiency of temporal proximity alone to establish a
prima facie case. 314
A strong proximity rule for the prima facie case is also preferable
because it maintains the distinction between the plaintiff's two bur-
dens. 315
 Courts with strong proximity rules generally define the prima
facie burden as easily met, as the Supreme Court of the United States
has.316
 Furthermore, some courts with strong proximity rules declare
explicitly that the burden to establish a prima facie case is not the
same as the ultimate burden of proof!" In contrast, courts with weak
proximity rules generally blur the distinction between the two bur-
dens. 318
 Some explicitly require a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case
by a preponderance of the evidence, the same standard by which a
plaintiff must ultimately prove pretext. 319
 In trying to correct what
they perceive as the excessively low burden of establishing a prima
facie case, therefore, these courts essentially defeat the purpose of the
burden shift. 32°
A case by case alternative is no more appealing. 321 Courts with
case by case rules make the sufficiency of temporal proximity purely
contextual. 322
 Although every court agrees that evaluating temporal
proximity depends on its factual context, at least to some extent, a
case by case rule provides no clear standards regarding the prima fa-
cie case burden. 323
 Moreover, a case by case approach to the prima
facie case is unnecessary. 324 In Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., the
Third Circuit supported its case by case rule by emphasizing the im-
314 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also, e.g., Slattery, 248 F.3d
at 95 (finding claim fails despite timing sufficient to establish prima facie causal connec-
tion).
315 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
316 See id. at 253 ("not onerous"); Slattery, 248 F.3d at 94 ( — de minimis'" (quoting
Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994))); Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 86
("'not great'" (quoting McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984) )).
317 See Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) ("At the summary judg-
ment stage, the prima facie case need not be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.")
(emphasis added).
316 See Harris v. King, No. 98-5826, 2000 WL 353676, at *2-3 (fith Cir. 2000); Dowe, 145
F.3d at 656-57,
319 E.g. Harris, 2000 WL 353676, at *2-3.
m See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54; see also Smith, supra note 8, at 377 (critiquing the
burden shift, in part, precisely because the prima fade burden is easily mei).
521 See Oat, 240 F.3d at 616: I tuition, 227 F.3t1 at 1051; Farm.!!, 2116 F.:441 al 279.
342
 See Oest, 240 F.b1 at 616; !bubo,,. 227 Fid al 1461: 	 206 F :14141 27' 1 .
323 See Ow. 210 F.3c1ai 616: lhuhun, 227 F.:141 al 1 1 01: hood/. 2111, 11 ul J1 2 7 ' 4
324 See (Mt, 210 F.ad Ai 6111; /tad 	 . 227 F.:St1Ji 110.'11:	 s . I. IAA 27'0
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portance of the "specific facts and circumstances" of each case. 325 But
the purpose of the prima fade case requirement is not to weigh and
evaluate all of the evidence in a retaliation clahn. 326 That is the pur-
pose of the three stages of the burden shift collectively. 327
 Instead, the
purpose of the prima facie case is simply to determine if the plaintiff
has raised an inference of retaliation—a burden for which temporal
proximity alone should suffice. 328
C. A Discretionary Standard for Summary Judgment
As with the prima facie case analysis, a strong proximity rule ap-
proach to summary judgment is likely the most appropriate. 328 Courts
with strong proximity rules hold temporal proximity sufficient to cre-
ate a genuine material issue for the jury, at least in some cases. 338 In
contrast, courts with weak proximity rules generally require a plaintiff
to produce additional evidence of a causal connection. 331 Similarly,
courts with case by case rules generally require additional proof of
pretext.332 Unlike in the prima facie case analysis, this difference does
not hinge on different understandings of the burden for summary
judgment resolution. 333 It depends instead on different evaluations of
the probative value of temporal proximity evidence. 334 A strong prox-
imity rule for summary judgment resolution incorporates both an ap-
propriate recognition of the probative value of temporal proximity
and sufficient discretion for a court to grant summary judgment in
cases in which it is appropriate. 335
In a retaliation claim, evaluating summary judgment disposition
requires an understanding of the plaintiff's ultimate burden of
proof.336 To prove retaliation under the burden shift, a plaintiff must
first establish a prima facie case and then, if the defendant produces
323
	
F.3d at 279 n.5.
320 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
327 See id. at 25611,8, 253-56.
"" See id. at 253-54,
3" See Cifra, 252 E3d at 217; Passantino, 212 F.3(1 at 507.
33o
	 Cifra, 252 Rid at 217; Passantino, 212 F.3d at 507.
331 See Harris, 2000 WI., 353676, at *3; Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d
1220, 1230 (D.N.M. 2001) (citing Tenth Circuit precedent).
332 See Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., 216 F.3d 707, 716 (8th Cir. 2000); Farrell, 206
F.3d at 279 n.5; Bermudez, 138 F.3d at 1179.
"3 See supra notes 302-314 and accompanying text.
334 Compare Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217-18, with Buettner, 216 F.3d at 716.
3" See supra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
336 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-10, 510 n.3.
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evidence of legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the adverse action,
prove those reasons to be, in fact, pretext for retaliation. 337
 The issue
for summary judgment resolution of a retaliation claim, then, is
whether a reasonable jury could find that a retaliatory motive caused
the adverse action, based on the evidence in the record viewed most
favorably to the plaintiff. 33°
Practically, the plaintiffs evidence for ultimately proving retalia-
tion may be the same as the evidence used to establish a prima facie
case. 5" The plaintiff must prove the same causal connection to suc-
ceed in proving pretext as is necessary to establish a prima fade causal
connection.3" The difference between the two stages is the burden
that the plaintiff faces. 341
 Although the evidentiary burden at the
prima facie case stage may be "de minimis," the ultimate burden—the
burden at the pretext stage—requires a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 342
 The sufficiency of temporal proximity evidence alone to de-
feat a motion for summary judgment, therefore, depends on the
sufficiency of temporal proximity to prove a causal connection by a
preponderance of the evidence.345
This determination, in turn, depends on the evidentiary record
as a whole.m4
 In ruling on a defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, a court credits the inference of a causal connection that a
prima facie case establishes. If the record indicates no valid, credi-
ble reason for the adverse action, then a reasonable jury could find a
causal connection based solely on temporal proximity. 346
 For example,
if the record indicates that the plaintiff had an exemplary employ-
337 See supra notes 7, 39-45 and accompanying text.
338 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-10, 510 n.3.
999 See Reeves V. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); Burdine,
450 U.S. at 256 n.10. The Supreme Court has recognized this fact in holding that the
factfinder may consider the same evidence at the pretext stage as at the prima fade stage,
despite the difference in burdens that the plaintiff faces at each. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143;
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n.10.
34° See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54, 256.
94I See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text,
342 See Hicks, 502 U.S. at 509-10, 510 n.3.
30 See id.; see also Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217-18 (stating standard for summary judgment).
344 See Warren, 2001 WL 1216979, at *2; Cifra, 252 F.3d at 216; Hudson, 227 F.3d at 1050;
Dowe, 145 F.3d at 656; Oliver, 846 F.2d at 105. Summary judgment depends "on a number
of factors. Those include the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative
value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence ... that
may be considered." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49; see also id. at 150 (equating the summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law standards).
349 See, e.g., Oliver, 846 F.2d at 105.
346 See Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217-18.
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ment record with an economically vibrant employer, but became the
object of adverse action soon after engaging in protected activity, a
reasonable jury probably could find the employer liable for retaliation
by a preponderance of the evidence.347 On the contrary, if the defense
has a strong case, temporal proximity alone will not be sufficient. 348
For example, if the defendant has produced a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for its adverse action and the plaintiff's only evi-
dence of a causal connection is temporal proximity, summary judg-
ment hi favor of the defendant is appropriate 349
Some courts with strong proximity rules incorporate this ap-
proach to summary judgment resolution. 350 The Second Circuit pro-
vides a good example. 351 In Cifra v. General Electric Co., the court held
temporal proximity sufficient to establish a prima facie causal connec-
tion.352 Although the record contained no other evidence of a causal
connection, the court held that a rational fact-finder could find a
causal connection based solely on the temporal proximity evidence,
and therefore, could find the defendant liable for retaliation. 353 In
Slattery, however, the court produced a different result applying the
same rule. 364 In considering the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the court evaluated evidence that the adverse action was
part of an extended disciplinary process. 355 Under the circumstances,
temporal proximity was insufficient to prove a causal connection be-
tween the adverse action and the protected activity by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.356
In contrast, courts with weak proximity rules generally hold tem-
poral proximity alone insufficient to create a genuine material is-
sue. 357 They require additional evidence of a causal connection, re-
gardless of the facts in a case. 358 Similarly, jurisdictions with case by
M7 See id.
mo See Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95; Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12,16-17 (1st
Cir. 1997).
549 See Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95; Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16-17.
33° See Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217-18; Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95; Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16-17.
331 See Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217-18; Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95.
352 See 252 F.3d at 217.
353 See id. at 218.
354 See 248 F.3d at 95.
335 See id,
355 See id.
357 See Harris, 2000 WL 353676, at *3; Dowe, 145 F.3d at 656-57; Swanson, 110 F.3d at
1188; Ward, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
353 See Harris, 2000 WL 353676, at *3; Dowe, 145 F.3d at 656-57; Swanson, 110 F.3d at
1188; Want 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
778	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:741
case rules require more than temporal proximity to create a genuine
material issue, even though, by definition, they weigh the sufficiency
of temporal proximity evidence according to the context of each
case. 3" In doing so, courts with both types of rules raise the bar for
temporal proximity evidence too high. 3" As a general proposition,
they may grant defendants' motions for summary judgment even in
cases in which a reasonable jury could find a causal connection based
on temporal proximity. 361
 Courts with strong proximity rules for
summary judgment resolution are more effective in distinguishing
cases in which summary judgment is appropriate from those in which
it is not. 362
D. Circumstantial Proof of Knowledge
Finally, courts should adopt the Eleventh Circuit's approach to
the knowledge requirements" The Eleventh Circuit expressly allows a
plaintiff to meet the knowledge requirement with the same evidence
used to meet the causal connection requirement. 384
 In doing so, the
court has held temporal proximity sufficient circumstantial proof of
knowledge.363
 Although unique, this approach best serves the purpose
of the burden shift while upholding the appropriate standards of
proof for a retaliation claim. 366
In many courts, regardless of the type of temporal proximity rule,
a plaintiff must make a showing of knowledge independent of tempo-
ral proximity evidence.367 Some courts identify the knowledge re-
quirement as a fourth element of a prima fade case, comparable to
protected activity, adverse action, and a causal connection. 368 Others
treat the knowledge requirement as part of the causal connection re-
quirement, but require a separate showing of knowledge neverthe-
332 See Buettner; 216 F.3d at 716; Farrell, 206 F.3d at 279 n.5; Bermudez, 138 F.3d at 1179.
36° See, e.g., Harris, 2000 WL 353676, at *3 (weak proximity rule); Buettner, 216 F.3d at
716 (case by case rule).
361 See Harris, 2000 WL 353676, at *3; Buettner; 216 F.3d at 716.
362
 See Cifra, 252 F.3d at 217-18; Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95.
363 See Bass, 242 F.34 at 1015.
364 See id.
" See id.
366 See id.
367 See, e.g., Jeffries, 2001 WL 845486, at *4; Hazward, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 124-25.
366 See Jeffries, 2001 WL 845486, at *4.
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less.369
 Each of these approaches to the knowledge requirement, how-
ever, lacks the benefits of the Eleventh Circuit's approach." 9
First, the Eleventh Circuit appropriately recognizes that the
knowledge requirement is really part of the causal connection re-
quirement." Both requirements derive from the same chain of logic.
To prove retaliation, a plaintiff must prove that a causal connection
exists between protected activity and adverse action." To prove a
causal connection, however, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
knew of the protected activity." The defendant could not have taken
adverse action because of protected activity if the defendant did not
know about the protected activity. 374
 Proving knowledge, therefore,
essentially proves one aspect of a causal connection." Courts that
require a showing of knowledge separate from the showing of a causal
connection implicitly, illogically, and unnecessarily add another hur-
dle to a plaintiff's case."
Second, the Eleventh Circuit maintains the distinction between
the prima facie case burden and the ultimate burden in a retaliation
claim." By requiring a separate showing of knowledge at the prima
facie case stage, other courts require more evidence than is otherwise
necessary to establish a prima facie case." In doing so, they raise the
prima facie burden closer to the ultimate burden and defeat the pur-
pose of the burden shift." The Supreme Court established the bur-
den shift as a framework for evaluating circumstantial evidence. 380
Requiring a separate showing of knowledge, however, fails to uphold
that purpose. 381
 If the separate showing is intended to require direct
evidence of knowledge, then it requires at least some direct evidence
of a causal connection and, therefore, of retaliation. 382
 If, on the con-
trary, circumstantial evidence of knowledge is sufficient, then a plain-
363 See Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657; Hazward, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 124-25.
"0
 See Bass, 242 F.3d at 1015.
"I See id.
372 See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268,273 (2001); see also, e.g., Pas-
santino, 212 F.3d at 506 (listing elements required to prove retaliation).
373
 See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 278.
374 See id.
3" See Bass, 242 F.3d at 1015.
576 See Cilia, 252 F.3d at 216-18.
377 See Bass, 242 F.3d at 1015.
376 See Cifra, 252 F.3d at 216-18.
3" See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-56.
33° See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
381 But see Dome, 145 F.3d at 657; Hazward, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 124-25.
382 See Bass, 242 F.3d at 1015.
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tiff should be able to prove knowledge with temporal proximity evi-
dence, in the same way that the plaintiff is able to prove a causal con-
nection with temporal proximity evidence. 383
In some cases, proving retaliation ultimately may require more
evidence of knowledge than establishing a prima fade case. 384 Like-
wise, in many cases, proving a causal connection requires additional
evidence. 385
 In both situations, however, the sufficiency of temporal
proximity to create a genuine issue of material fact should depend on
the circumstances of a particular case. 388 Requiring additional evi-
dence of knowledge per se unduly supports defendants' motions for
summary judgment in cases in which a reasonable jury could find a
causal connection based on temporal proximity alone. 387
This understanding of the knowledge requirement is fully com-
patible with the Supreme Court's decision in Clark County School Dis-
trict v. Breeden. 388
 In that case, the Supreme Court held simply that
proof of retaliation requires proof of knowledge. 382 The Court neither
defined any standard for the knowledge requirement nor required
direct evidence of knowledge. 3" Presumably, proof of knowledge may
be circumstantial. 391 If so, temporal proximity should be sufficient to
prove knowledge, in addition to proving the causal connection as a
whole."2
383 See id.
384 See id. at 1016 (holding sufficient evidence for establishment of prima facie case
and reversal of summary judgment in favor of defendant and remanding for further pro-
ceedings).
383 See Slattery, 248 F.3d at 95 (finding implicitly that plaintiff produced sufficient evi-
dence to establish a prima facie case, but insufficient evidence for ultimate proof of retalia-
tion to survive summary judgment).
386 See Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16-17 (weighing sufficiency of evidence at summary judg-
ment in light of the record as a whole).
387 See, e.g., Cribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2001). In Gribcheck, the
court held that the plaintiff had shown sufficient temporal proximity to establish a prima
facie case based on evidence of a lawsuit against his employer that was ongoing when his
employer took adverse action. See id. The court also found that the plaintiff sufficiently
established that the employer knew about the lawsuit because the plaintiff had allegedly
deposed his supervisors. See id. Without evidence of the deposition or other evidence of
knowledge, however, the plaintiff's case may have failed despite the strong circumstantial
evidence of an ongoing lawsuit against the employer. See id.
586 See 532 U.S. at 273 (2001).
388 See id.
380 See id.
391 See id.
382 See id; Bass, 242 F.3d at 1015.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the conflicting treatment of temporal proximity evidence
by different federal jurisdictions, a single, optimal rule for such evi-
dence can be identified. According to this rule, courts should adopt a
broad definition of temporal proximity—specifically, adverse action
close in time to protected activity. In turn, courts should determine
the length of time necessary to meet this standard depending, to
some extent, on the circumstances of each case. Courts should also,
however, recognize the fundamental sufficiency of temporal proximity
for establishing a prima facie case. Moreover, at least in cases in which
the factual context makes it appropriate, temporal proximity alone
should be sufficient to create a genuine material issue for the jury,
and therefore, to defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Finally, temporal proximity alone should be sufficient to .meet the
knowledge requirement in a retaliation claim.
Such a rule for temporal proximity upholds both the purpose of
the burden shift and the Title VII protection against retaliation that
the burden shift serves. Courts adopting such a rule would sustain the
burden shift as the framework for evaluating circumstantial evidence.
They would recognize the value of circumstantial evidence in retalia-
tion claims and maintain the distinction between the plaintiff's prima
facie and ultimate burdens. In preserving the burden shift, these
courts would preserve access to Title VII and maintain the statute's
balance between employee rights and employer interests. Moreover,
in adopting a uniform standard, they would bring consistency to an
otherwise conflicting but increasingly significant focus of federal em-
ployment law.
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